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I. INTRODUCTION
In British common law nations, including the United States and
New Zealand, the affirmative defense of reasonable parental disci-
pline justifies assault on a child. The parental discipline defense con-
templates innumerable methods of physical discipline, including
hitting, restraining, and placing a child in "time-out," which entails
* J.D., LL.M., Clinical Supervising Attorney, Domestic Violence Advocacy Project,
NCCU School of Law. Primary research for this paper was conducted while a Master of Laws
student at the University of Wellington School of Law in New Zealand in 2001.
1
Brobst: The Parental Discipline Defense in New Zealand: The Potential Imp
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2005
2005]PARENTAL DISCIPLINE DEFENSE IN NEW ZEALAND 179
physically isolating the child for a period of time. Without the de-
fense, parents may be subject to criminal charges or civil liability for
assault and battery, or the acts could be grounds for removal of the
child in protective order, care and protection, or custody proceedings.
Although analyses of the defense have tended to focus on its use in
criminal court,' its application in civil proceedings is equally important
to the welfare of children and the accountability of adults who abuse
them. New Zealand and the United States provide instructive exam-
ples of how the courts in child welfare, domestic violence, and family
law cases have struggled to find a consistent approach to physical child
abuse when forced to interpret the reasonableness of the use of force
on children.
By either statute or case law, the elements of the defense in British
common law nations generally require a showing that the use of force
by a parent on a child for the purpose of correction was reasonable.2
Although efforts have been made in the United States to statutorily
define reasonableness, New Zealand has never had any statutory mea-
sure in place limiting a defendant from using this defense for even the
most heinous of crimes.3 New Zealand's parental discipline defense is
presently embodied in section 59 of the Crimes Act of 1961:
1. See Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment De-
fense - Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 413; David Oren-
tlicher, Spanking and Other Corporal Punishment of Children by Parents: Overvaluing Pain,
Undervaluing Children, 35 Hous. L. REV. 147, 151-152 (1998); Scott A. Davidson, When is Pa-
rental Discipline Child Abuse?, in DISCUSSION PAPER: LEGAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE
PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN 42 (Judy Cashmore and Nicola de Haas, eds., National
Child Protection Council/Australia and Commonwealth Dept. of Human Serv. and Health, May
1995); Simon Mount, Physical Punishment in the Home: A Private Prerogative?, 7 AUCKLAND
U. L. REV. 985, 987 (1995); Rochelle Urlich, Physical Discipline in the Home, 7 AUCKLAND U. L.
REV. 851, 853 (1994); Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-mak-
ing, 24 AM. CriM. L. REV. 315, 340-341 (1986); and Deana Pollard, Banning Corporal Punish-
ment: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. U. LAW REV. 447 (2002). But see The Vagueness of
Child Abuse Laws, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. LAW 403 (1995-96), and Deana Pollard, Banning
Child Corporal Punishment, 77 TUL. L. REV. 575 (2003).
2. Australia: Queensland (Criminal Code Act, § 280 (1899)), Western Australia (Criminal
Code Act Compilation Act 1913, § 257), and Tasmania (Criminal Code Act 1924, § 50); Criminal
Code, § 43 (Can.); Crimes Act, § 61 (1969) (Cook Islands); Children and Young Persons Act,
§ 1(7) (1933) (Eng.); Children Act 1908, § 37 (Ir.); and Children and Young Persons Act 1937,
§ 12 (Scot.). State jurisdictions in the United States vary considerably in their application and
statutory reform of the parental discipline defense, although originally the United States com-
prehensively adopted the language of the English common law justification. See generally Kan-
dice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense -
Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 413; Victor I. Vieth, Corpo-
ral Punishment in the United States: A Call for a New Approach to the Prosecution of Discipli-
narians, 15 J. Juv. L. 22 (1994).
3. On May 14, 2003, the New Zealand government announced that any final decisions
about legislative change would be deferred until after a planned public education campaign be-
ginning in 2004 has been evaluated. Office of the Commissioner for Children (New Zealand),
REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITITEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
(JUNE 2003). This campaign, "SKIP: Strategies with Kids - Information for Parents cam-
2
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(1) Every parent of a child and, subject to subsection (3) of this sec-
tion, every person in the place of the parent of a child is justified in
using force by way of correction towards the child, if the force used is
reasonable in the circumstances.
(2) The reasonableness of the force used is a question of fact.
(3) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section justifies the use of force
towards a child in contravention of section 139A of the Education Act
of 1989.
As a defense of justification, the parental discipline defense means
that a child cannot legally resist a reasonable parental assault.4 Simi-
larly, in American school corporal punishment cases, courts have held
that injuries to students, including broken arms, were "self-inflicted"
because the students resisted lawful, justified corporal punishment.'
Thus, in some parental discipline cases in which parents have been
acquitted despite having inflicted bruises, welts, and worse upon chil-
dren, the legal position has been that the children should have re-
mained still and received the injuries passively because the use of
force was reasonable.
Despite the increasing trend in many European nations to abolish
the right of parents to corporally punish children,6 the parental disci-
pline defense continues to be enforced in every state of the United
States and every British Commonwealth nation. Much criticism of the
defense has emerged, particularly when juries in criminal court acquit
paign," was launched by the Minister for Social Development and Employment on May 6, 2004.
The campaign provides funding for positive parenting programs. Personal communication, Ni-
cola Taylor, Children's Issues Centre, University of Otago Auckland Centre, March 23, 2005.
4. J.C. SMITH, JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (Stevens & Sons,
London, 1989) 19. See Charles Co. DSS v. Vann, 855 A.2d 313 (Md. 2004) (no right to resist); cf
State v. Miller, 98 P.3d 265 (Haw. 2004) (right to resist if parent provoked "misbehavior").
Also, previously in marital rape cases, the husband's right to use violence to force his wife to
engage in sexual intercourse meant that the wife had no right to protect herself from the vio-
lence. See R v. Miller, 2 Q.B. 282, 2 All E.R. 529 (1954). See also Jacob v. State, 22 Tenn. 493
(1842) (Tirley J.), holding that a slave had no right to resist a physical beating by his American
master, and was convicted and hung for murder after fighting back.
5. See Jerry R. Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment in Public
Schools: Jurisprudence that is Literally Shocking to the Conscience, 39 S.D. L. REV. 276, 276
(1994).
6. The following nations now legally prohibit parental corporal punishment: Sweden
(1979), Finland (1983), Norway (1987), Austria (1989), Cyprus (1994), Italy (1996), Denmark
(1997), Latvia (1998), Portugal (1999), Croatia (1999), Germany (2000), Israel (2000), Belgium
(2000), Iceland (2003), Ukraine (2004), Romania (2004). Nations in the process of reforming the
parental discipline defense include Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, England, Ireland, The Nether-
lands, Scotland and Wales. See NEW ZEALAND CABINET, PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT: COMPLIANCE
WITH UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (UNCROC) (Cabinet Of-
fice, Wellington, SEQ (01) 15, 23 March 2001) app. A "International Legal Positions on the
Physical Punishment of Children"; www.endcorporalpunishment.org (last accessed 11/14/04). In
Spain, the reformed civil code struck out "the power to punish" one's children, and article 617 of
the Penal Code criminalizes hitting or mistreating another whether or not injury is caused.
GRACIA JUSTE ORTEGA ET AL., SPANIARDS' ATrrrUDES TOWARDS PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT IN
CHILDREN (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Madrid, 1997) 14.
3
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parents who have physically injured their children under the guise of
reasonable corporal punishment. In June 2004, the Council of Europe
called for a ban on parental corporal punishment of children, calling it
a "degrading" practice.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN-
CROC) has also required member States to ensure that the parental
discipline defense does not justify harm to children. Article 19 re-
quires states to "take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social
and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physi-
cal or mental violence, injury or abuse,... while in the care of par-
ent(s) . . . ." From the language of the instrument itself, it is unclear
whether UNCROC actually requires an abolition of all or even certain
forms of corporal punishment.8 However, the United Nations Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted sections of UN-
CROC to mean that any "reasonable discipline" defense is non-
compliant, including those that protect parental and educational use
of corporal punishment.9
International pressure has begun to have an effect on the approach
of English common law nations to parental discipline. In 1998, the
United Kingdom was obliged to instigate legal reform of the parental
discipline defense based on international human rights violations, and
chose to restrict the definition of reasonableness. The European
Court of Human Rights held in A v. United Kingdom1° that England's
parental discipline defense, identical in substance to New Zealand's,
failed to protect children from inhumane or degrading treatment as
required by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Court examined an acquittal of a step-father (to-be) charged with
assault occasioning bodily injury. The defendant had caned his nine
year old step-son, causing multiple bruises. According to England's
Department of Health, this case "has exposed that the law needs
7. For the full text of the Draft Recommendations of the June 4, 2004 Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly, see http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc04EDOC10
199.htm (last accessed 11/13/04).
8. See Abdullahi An-Na'Im, Cultural Transformation and Normative Consensus on the
Best Interests of the Child, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 62 (Philip Alson ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994).
9. The sections relied on are section 3 (best interests of the child), 19 (anti-violence in the
home), and 28.2 (anti-degrading treatment in schools). U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF
THE COMMrITEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 2000 (55th Session, A/55/41). This report rec-
ommends the prohibition of corporal punishment of children in the home in many nations, in-
cluding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (id. at 18, 78), Fiji (id. at 24, 123), Japan
(id. at 31, 179), and Luxembourg (id. at 42, 260).
10. A v. U.K., Eur. Ct. H.R. 100/1997/884/1096 (1998).
4
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modernising to make sure that children are protected from harsh
physical punishment.""
In A v. United Kingdom, public criminal prosecution and arrest of a
father garnered more high profile media attention than would the
confidential proceedings of a child welfare case or the private actions
of Family Court. However, any reform measures to the parental disci-
pline defense must anticipate the impact of reform on civil as well as
criminal proceedings. What follows is an examination of the applica-
tion of the defense in civil domestic violence protection order, custody
and guardianship, and care and protection proceedings, primarily us-
ing the jurisdiction of New Zealand as an example. However, the ef-
forts and concerns of New Zealand's Family Court and its child
protection agency resonate with the experiences of other common law
nations, including the United States, which struggle against family vio-
lence while trying to balance parental rights, child rights and popular
opinion.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTION ORDER PROCEEDINGS
Physical child abuse is currently addressed in New Zealand's Do-
mestic Violence Act of 1995. The 1995 Act provides the Family Court
with increased power to consider domestic/family violence against
children when granting civil protection orders. 2 For example, the
definition of psychological abuse to a child now includes causing the
child to witness domestic violence. 13 In the 1995 Act, domestic vio-
lence is defined as violence within a domestic relationship, including
physical abuse and threats of physical abuse.' 4 A domestic relation-
ship may be between partners or between family members, 15 which
would include the parent/child relationship.
In granting a protection order, the Court may impose limitations on
access to children' 6 and require participation in programs 17 such as
offender treatment programs or parenting classes. While the condi-
tions are similar to the dispositions of care and protection and guardi-
11. DEPT. OF HEALTH (ENG.), PROTECTING CHILDREN, SUPPORTING PARENTS: A CONSUL-
TATION DOCUMENT ON THE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN 1.4 (January 2000). See also
THE SCOT-ISH ExEcuTIvE JUSTICE DEPT., THE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN IN SCOT-
LAND: A CONSULTATION 1.4 (February 2000).
12. Domestic Violence Act. 1995, § 14 (N.Z.).
13. Id. at § 3(3). Cf. Audrey E. Stone and Rebecca J. Fialk, Criminalizing the Exposure of
Children to Family Violence: Breaking the Cycle of Abuse, in 271 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE
TAX LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 331 (November 1998) (reprinted
from 20 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 205 (1997)).
14. Domestic Violence Act, 1995, § 3 (N.Z.).
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anship proceedings, as well as some criminal sentences, the
functioning of domestic violence protection orders is something of a
hybrid between a criminal and civil approach. The protection order
itself is civil, but violation of the order is a criminal offense.' 8 A do-
mestic violence protection order is sought by individual plaintiffs, and
a child victim would need an adult willing to request such an order on
his or her behalf. However, these orders have been criticized as cost
prohibitive, especially given that ninety-six percent of applications are
made through the use of lawyers. 19
To invoke the Domestic Violence Act of 1995 and obtain a protec-
tion order on behalf of child victims of parental physical abuse, an
incidence of "violence" must be proven.2 ° Violence is defined in part
as "physical abuse," but also includes psychological and sexual
abuse.2 ' The operative word in this definition is "abuse." Note that
no specific reference is made to the corporal punishment of children
under the Act. In Bragg v. Hawea, "abuse" under the Domestic Vio-
lence Act of 1995 was given the dictionary definition of "an improper
usage; a corrupt practice or improper use, perversion. '22 This broad
definition provides the court with much discretion. However, if the
alleged offending parent raises the equally broadly defined defense of
reasonable discipline, the fact-finder has nearly unfettered discretion
to determine if the child is a victim of domestic violence.
A. The Parental Discipline Defense in DVPO Proceedings
Without explicit guidance from the legislature, when enacting more
expansive protections against domestic violence, courts have been
called upon to define whether the domestic violence reforms have im-
plicitly repealed the parental discipline defense. The Family Court of
New Zealand has held that the anti-family violence provisions of the
Domestic Violence Act of 1995 did not repeal the possible justifica-
tion for such violence in section 59 of the Crimes Act of 1961.23 Simi-
larly, in Hawaii, the Hawaii Court of Appeals recently held that
18. The Domestic Violence Act, section 49, creates a summary offense for violation of a
domestic violence protection order.
19. HELENA BARWICK ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT 1995 PROCESS EVALUATION 10
(Ministry of Justice (N.Z.), April 2000). In the United States, state governments that access
certain federal grants to enhance criminal prosecution and availability of domestic violence pro-
tective orders have assumed the cost based on federal legislation under the Violence Against
Women Act (2000).
20. Domestic Violence Act, 1995, § 14 (N.Z.).
21. Id. at § 3(2). Note that "violence" in other criminal offenses has been interpreted to
require a certain degree of injury. See Peneha v. Police [1996] H.C. Gisborne AP 8/96, 7-8 (rob-
bery). This has not been the case under the Domestic Violence Act 1995.
22. Bragg v. Hawea [1996] N.Z.F.L.R. 874, NZFLR LEXIS 130, 16-17.
23. Id.; B v. H [1996] 15 F.R.N.Z. 275; Ausage v. Ausage [1997] N.Z.F.L.R. 72, NZFLR
LEXIS 43, 15; A v. A, [1997] 17 F.R.N.Z. 13.
6
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physical harm under the statutory definition of family violence does
not preclude the use of parental corporal punishment to discipline a
child.24 Since the 1995 Act, the High Court of New Zealand has con-
tinued to consider section 59 when reviewing a protection order appli-
cation involving a parent's alleged violence to a child.25 As will be
shown with respect to other civil proceedings, the Family Court has
provided parents with less latitude under the parental discipline de-
fense in domestic violence protection order proceedings than parents
have received in criminal courts.
For example, deliberately attempting to discipline a child in a man-
ner that would not leave marks, such as hitting the sole of a child's
foot, has been found to be an aggravating factor indicating that disci-
pline was unreasonable in protection order proceedings.26 Use of im-
plements is unacceptable.27 Causing less severe injuries, including
inflicting welts by striking a child with a jug cord,28 and more severe
abuse, including punching a child causing a black eye,29 have both
been deemed an unreasonable use of force in protection order pro-
ceedings.30 A kick to the buttocks without injury "constitutes im-
proper use of physical force beyond usually accepted disciplinary
action."'" In this case, the kick was determined to be domestic vio-
lence in the context of "a pattern of behaviour '3 2 pursuant to section
14(b)(3) of the Domestic Violence Act, which states:
[W]here some or all of the behaviour in respect of which the [protec-
tion order] application is made appears to be minor or trivial when
viewed in isolation, or appears unlikely to recur, the Court must nev-
ertheless consider whether the behaviour forms part of a pattern of
behaviour in respect of which the applicant, or a child of the appli-
cant's family, or both, need protection.33
Contrast this ruling with a kick to the buttocks that has been found to
be reasonable in criminal proceedings. 31
Physical force, found to be justified under the parental discipline
defense in protection order proceedings, includes vigorous pushes to
the shoulder;35 a smack to the bottom; 36 and a slap to the face.37 No
24. Rezentes v. Rezentes, 965 P.2d 133 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998).
25. Y v. Y [1998] Auckland H.C. 122/97, 15.
26. Kellen v. Hansen [1997] D.C. Auckland FP 004/889/97, 15.
27. Y v. Y [1998] Auckland H.C. 122/97,15.
28. Arvidson v. Croft [1996] N.Z.F.L.R. 741.
29. M v. M [2000] F.C. Wanganui FP 083/240/00.
30. See also Lane v. Lane [2000] F.C. Christchurch FP 326/00.
31. Bragg v. Hawea [1996] N.Z.F.L.R. 874, NZFLR LEXIS 130, 17.
32. Id. at 21.
33. Domestic Violence Act, 1995 § 14(b)(3) (N.Z.).
34. Gerrard v. Police [1989] H.C. Hamilton AP 96/89.
35. Pushes to the shoulder "may be acceptable discipline or are at least borderline domestic
violence." Bragg, at 7.
7
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case law has been found with respect to protection order proceedings,
in which the Family Court has found the infliction of less severe inju-
ries such as bruising and welts to be justified under section 59 of the
Crimes Act of 1961.
In a review of case law, children generally appear to receive greater
legal protection in civil protection order proceedings than in criminal
trials involving the parental discipline defense. However, there is an
irony inherent in the combination of section 59 and the Domestic Vio-
lence Act of 1995. While a protection order could be granted on the
basis that a father allowed his child to witness him slap his wife, the
father could then be legally justified under the parental discipline de-
fense and receive no punishment under the Domestic Violence Act
when he turned around and slapped his child for watching the event.
Thus, the parental discipline defense also inhibits the protection of
children from violence in protection order proceedings, at least pro-
tection to the same extent given to adult victims of family violence.
B. A Pro-Prosecution Approach to Family Violence?
Like much of the West, New Zealand has adopted an aggressive
pro-prosecution approach to spousal abuse.38 The objective of the
Domestic Violence Act of 1995 has been termed "an interventionist
approach."39 The language of the Act reflects this with its objectives
of "(a) [r]ecognising that domestic violence, in all its forms, is unac-
ceptable behaviour; and (b) [e]nsuring that, where domestic violence
occurs, there is effective legal protection for its victims."40 Consider
also the objective of "[p]roviding more effective sanctions and en-
forcement in the event that a protection order is breached."'" This
contrasts with the fairly non-interventionist "assistance to the family"
language of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act of
36. Bragg, at 22.
37. Steyn v. Brett [1997] N.Z.F.L.R. 312.
38. Chief Executive of Women's Refuge in New Zealand, Merepeka Raukawa-Tait, stated:
"What we have been saying is if anyone is at risk [of domestic violence], prosecute. The sen-
tence has to reflect that." Geraldine Johns, Judiciary 'gutless' says refuge head, SUNDAY STAR
TIMES, December 31, 2000, at Al. However, note that in New Zealand, while policies against
spousal abuse may be aggressively pro-prosecution, actual police practice may be less so. See
HELENA BARWICK ET AL., DoMEsTic VIOLENCE ACT 1995 PROCESS EVALUATION 13 (Ministry
of Justice (N.Z.), April 2000); and Helene Carbonatto, The Criminal Justice System Response to
Domestic Violence in New Zealand 10 CRIMINOLOGY AOTEAROAIN.Z. 7, 7 (1998).
39. Bragg, at 25.
40. Domestic Violence Act, 1995, § 5(a)-(b) (N.Z.).
41. Id. § 5(e). Breach of a protection order may result in summary conviction and a term of
imprisonment up to six months; or, with priors, an indictable conviction and up to two years
imprisonment. Id. § 49(2)-(3).
8
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1989 in care and protection matters.4 z Nowhere in the 1989 Act is
"sanctions" an objective.
In some ways, the pro-prosecution stance to family violence appears
to apply to both adult and child victims equally. Both "assault on a
child"43 and "male assaults female"" increase the maximum prison
sentence for assault to two years, and bailable rights are limited for
each of these offenses.45 The Domestic Violence Act of 1995 applies
equally to all members in a domestic relationship. The prosecution of
family violence cases involving children is emphasized by the criminal
sanctions available for violation of protection orders based on a child
witnessing domestic violence. As argued, regarding family violence to
children in the United States: "Criminal sanctions send a message to
child witnesses that the violence they observe in their homes is a crim-
inal act that brings negative consequences to the perpetrator and
should not serve as a model for their future relationships."46
Nevertheless, government agencies and private resources in the
West have typically attended to spousal abuse separately from child
abuse and neglect, even when violent incidences against both a part-
ner and child overlap.47 The American Model Code on Domestic and
Family Violence defines domestic violence as acts by a family or
household member upon a minor or an adult.48 The definition ex-
cludes acts of self-defense, but makes no mention of the parental dis-
cipline defense or the legal right of parents to strike a child.
Apparently, the defenses specific to children were not contemplated.
In New Zealand, children's programs are only now being made
available under the Domestic Violence Act of 1995 because "demand
was high."49 Seventy-five percent of applicants for domestic violence
protection orders have children.5" A number of cases reported in the
42. See Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, 1989, § 13(b)(ii) (N.Z.)
("[ijntervention into family life should be the minimum necessary to ensure a child's or young
person's safety and protection").
43. Crimes Act, 1961, § 194(a) (N.Z.).
44. Id. § 194(b).
45. Id. § 319(2).
46. Audrey E. Stone & Rebecca J. Fialk, Criminalizing the Exposure of Children to Family
Violence: Breaking the Cycle of Abuse in 271 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE TAx LAW AND Es-
TATE PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 331 (November 1998) (reprinted from 20 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 205 (1997)).
47. Howard A. Davidson, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: Legal Connections and
Controversies, 29 FAM. L. Q. 357, 359 (1995).
48. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 102(1) (Nat'l Council of Juv. &
Fain. Ct. Judges 1994).
49. HELENA BARWICK ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT 1995 PROCESS EVALUATION 15
(Ministry of Justice (N.Z.), April 2000).
50. Id. at 10. Children have been present in 70% of family violence cases reported to the
New Zealand Police. BREAKING THE CYCLE 7-18 (Children & Young Persons Serv. (N.Z.), July
1996).
9
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Porirua charging study indicate an overlap between spousal and child
abuse.5 ' More than merely being "linked" with domestic violence,
physical child abuse and its manifestation as corporal punishment are
an integral part of the social problem of family violence. However,
New Zealand's agencies have shown an equivocal approach to inte-
grating child victims into family violence policies.
For example, the New Zealand Police Family Violence Policy52 mir-
rors the inclusiveness of the Domestic Violence Act of 1995 in its defi-
nition of a domestic relationship which includes parents and
children. 3 The core principles of the policy are: "(i) Protection of
victims (which includes children who witness family violence); (ii)
Holding assailants accountable; and (iii) Consistent practices across
agencies and groups."54 Nevertheless, despite the recognition that
children are involved in nearly 70% of reported family violence
cases,55 the policy suggests that instead of prosecuting offenses involv-
ing child family violence victims, police should generally refer them to
"a child advocacy service or agency."56 In a 2001 government study of
physical assault cases in the criminal court system, 84% of victims
were adults and only 6% were children aged 14 years or less.57
This study provides neither the consistency suggested by policy
principle (iii), nor does it hold the perpetrator accountable as sug-
gested by principle (ii). It also conflicts with the joint police and CYF
child abuse investigation protocol, which emphasizes the accountabil-
ity of the offender, 58 asserting the guiding principle that "[t]he physi-
cal and sexual abuse of a child is a criminal act which should be
investigated and may be prosecuted as such."
59
In addition, the New Zealand Police Family Violence Policy dis-
courages the use of diversion in family violence cases because it can
be too much of an "easy option, 6 ° when in reality family violence
51. See, e.g., app. "Year 2000 Physical Child Abuse Reports from Porirua."
52. N.Z. POLICE FAMILY VIOLENCE POLICY (1996). See also THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERN-
MENT STATEMENT OF POLICY ON FAMILY VIOLENCE.
53. N.Z. POLICE FAMILY VIOLENCE POLICY (1996).
54. Id. Pt. 1, § 4.
55. Id. Pt. 1, § 9.
56. See Id. Pt. 1, § 12.
57. CHRISTOPHER CLARK, THE AGE OF PHYSICAL ABUSE VICTIMS AND THE SENTENCE IM-
POSED ON THEIR ABUSERS 12 (Ministry of Justice (N.Z.), 2001). Police Association Wellington
delegate Det. Sgt. Stuart Mills explained: "[w]e are using the resources that we have in the best
way but it is disappointing that they are often not able to complete [child abuse] inquiries."
Sarah Prestwood, Higher Police Priority Urged for Child Abuse, THE DOMINION, 21 March 2001,
at 11.
58. CHILDREN & YOUNG PERSONS SERV., NZCYPS CARE AND PROTECTION HANDBOOK
VERSION 1.0 (1996) 3, 1.4, § 5-65, and 2.10, § 5-67.
59. Id. at 1 1.1, § 5-67.
60. N.Z. FAMILY VIOLENCE POLICY pt. 1, § 52 (1996). There is considerable debate
whether the use of diversion and restorative justice devalues spousal violence, or whether
10
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cases involving adult victims are not often diverted, while those in-
volving child victims are.6 ' That diversion is granted for child cases is
not the problem, because diversion can be effective in curbing recidi-
vism.6 2 Rather, the issue is that family violence cases involving adult
victims are viewed more seriously by law enforcement than those in-
volving child victims. In the most recent governmental review of the
Domestic Violence Act of 1995, no mention was made of the lack of
enforcement on behalf of children while practical barriers to enforcing
the Act on behalf of men and ethnic minorities were addressed.63
Even New Zealand's Children, Young Persons and Their Families
Service (now CYF) has expressed reluctance to join in the battle
against domestic violence as it relates to children. Upon passage of
the Domestic Violence Act of 1995, CYF stated:
It is important to ensure that the provisions of the Children, Young
Persons and Their Families Act are not used inappropriately in the
domestic violence arena and that actions under the Domestic Violence
Act do not routinely flow on to actions under the Children, Young
Persons, and Their Families Act.64
Part of the concern was that no new funding had been allocated to the
Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service to accommodate
increased notifications based on a more aggressive approach to family
violence.65
Thus, while the New Zealand Police suggested CYF handle the
physical child abuse cases, CYF suggested the police handle them.
This attitude may be changing given that in 1999 CYF began to imple-
ment its own family violence prevention programs and services. 66
prohibiting their use removes a valuable and effective option for reducing recidivism in batterers
and respecting the wishes of domestic violence victims. See Paula Martin, Restorative Justice - a
Family Violence Perspective, 6 Soc. POL'Y J. OF N.Z. 56, 60 (1996); Allison Morris, Law Reform
Initiatives on Violence Against Women, 1 CRIMINOLOGY AOTEAROAJN.Z. 5 (1994); and Helene
Carbonatto, Dilemmas in the Criminalisation of Spousal Abuse, 2 Soc. POL'Y J. OF N.Z. 21
(1994).
61. Interviews with Sgt. Paddy Darroch, Wellington Central Diversion Coordinator and Sgt.
Dean Rosson, Director of the Child Abuse Team, Wellington Central Police (23 January 2001).
62. From the beginning, the success rate of New Zealand's diversion program has been
found to be "exceptionally good." D.P.H. JONES, SUMMARY CRIMINAL HEARINGS FROM AR-
REST TO FINAL DECISION 44 (N.Z. Law Society seminar presentation, 1989). In Wellington, the
recidivism rate for diversion cases is 15% or less. Based on this success, Minister of Justice Phil
Goff has denied that diversion is justice behind closed doors. When Creating a Diversion Can
Work Wonders, THE DOMINION, March 19, 2001, at 9.
63. See HELENA BARWICK ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AcT 1995: PROCESS EVALUATION,
13 (Ministry of Justice (N.Z.), April 2000).
64. DEPT. OF SOCIAL WELFARE, CHILDREN, YOUNG PERSONS & THEIR FAMILIES SERV.
(N.Z.), SOCIAL WELFARE IN NEW ZEALAND: POST ELECTION BRIEFING PAPER 1996, 17 (1996).
65. Id.
66. THE OVERVIEW: POST-ELECTION BRIEFING 1999, 10 (Dept. of Child, Youth & Family
Serv. (N.Z.), 1999) 10; SAFETY ASSESSMENT FORM PILOT: EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT ON
CHILD, YOUTH AND FAMILY - ASSESSING RISK TO CHILDREN WHO LIVE WITH FAMILY VIO-
11
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Also, in response to a report by the Office of the Commissioner for
Children calling for more attention to children in family violence in-
vestigations, an internal review by the New Zealand Police of the
Family Violence Policy was undertaken.67
Note that some American jurisdictions are currently experiencing a
backlash to the increased inclusion of child victims in pro-prosecution
family violence policies. Bills have been introduced in a number of
American States to statutorily ensure that family violence and care
and protection abuse definitions do not include parental corporal pun-
ishment.68 Richard Garner has criticized Ohio's criminal domestic vi-
olence statute, which addresses "physical harm" to children, because it
is overbroad and fails to adequately define legal parental discipline.69
According to Garner:
The effective impact of Ohio's broad interpretation of domestic vio-
lence and its preferred arrest policy is the creation of an enforcement
scheme that gives law enforcement agencies carte blanche to arrest
any parent using any kind of corporal discipline and to prosecute any
such parent for domestic violence.7°
As corporal punishment inherently involves physical force, the min-
imum needed for prima facie proof of physical harm would be satis-
fied in every corporal punishment case. 71 However, Garner's criticism
is only applied regarding child victims. Cases involving adult family
violence victims would have the same minimum level of harm re-
quired to file charges. Ohio has since resolved that its statutory
scheme, including its domestic violence laws, does not repeal the right
of parents to use reasonable corporal punishment.72
The trend towards stronger domestic violence policies in New Zea-
land and the United States includes children as victims, but it has not
embraced their need for protection. Instead, domestic violence pro-
ceedings, such as DVPO hearings provide more hurdles for children
than adults through recognition of the parental discipline defense.
LENCE (Dept. of Child, Youth & Family Serv. (N.Z.), Wellington, 2000); Cara Elliott et al., Pro-
tecting Women and Children, 15 SOCIAL WORK Now 27 (2000); Anne Caton, The Interagency
Approach to Child Protection: What is Possible Today? 17 SOCAL WORK Now 28 (2000).
67. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM JAMES WHAKARURU REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONER FOR
CHILDREN STATUS REPORT - FINAL REPORT (NZ Police undated) (received from the Wellington
Police Dept. Child Abuse Team on January 30, 2001).
68. See SB 553 (enacted) (Nev. 1999); SB 26 (introduced) (Ga. 2001); HB 871 (introduced)
(Tex. 2001); HB 499 (introduced) (Md. 2001).
69. Richard Garner, Fundamentally Speaking: Application of Ohio's Domestic Violence
Laws in Parental Discipline Cases - A Parental Perspective, 30 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 1, 17 (1998).
The applicable domestic violence statute is OHIo REV. CODE § 2919.25(A).
70. Garner, supra note 68, at 17.
71. Id.
72. See State v. Adaranijo, 792 N.E.2d 1138 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) and BALDWIN'S OHIO
HANDBOOK SERIES, ch. 8, § 6 (2004).
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However, if a child injured through parental discipline has an adult
willing and financially able to initiate protection order proceedings on
the child's behalf, then at least the Family Court appears more likely
than the criminal court to take action to protect the child.
III. CUSTODY AND GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS
The Family Court also addresses parental corporal punishment in
custody and guardianship hearings to determine which home is safe
for the child to live in. Although family law in New Zealand contin-
ues to emphasize the parental right to control the upbringing of chil-
dren,73 family courts are increasingly giving credence to abuse
allegations as they gain a greater understanding of the characteristics
of family violence.74
In New Zealand in 1995, the Guardianship Act of 1968 was
amended to more specifically address allegations of violence in cus-
tody and access applications. Previously, the general welfare of the
child was to be considered in marriage dissolution hearings.75 Cus-
tody and unsupervised access is now restricted under section 16B of
the Guardianship Act if family violence has been perpetrated against
a child or in the child's presence.
Violence is defined as physical abuse or sexual abuse.76 When cus-
tody is at issue, the focus of court decision-making is on the best inter-
ests of the child, including the child's safety. "[P]unishment is no part
of the function of this Court. ' 7 7 However, a custody hearing is inher-
ently adversarial, which can inhibit full application of the para-
mountcy principle which protects the child's interests first:
No matter the setting, [child abuse] cases are difficult, emotionally
draining, and often incomprehensible. In the family court setting,
emotions, and anger from the divorce adds to the tension. Allegations
of abuse serve as a catalyst to rekindle and fan the flames of earlier
conflicts. Unless these cases are handled in a thorough and profes-
sional manner, the interests of the child can be lost.7 8
Thus, the court may appoint a lawyer on behalf of the child in custody
and guardianship proceedings.79
If a physical abuse finding involves parental corporal punishment,
then the parental discipline defense will apply. Following the determi-
73. See Neho v. Duncan [1994] N.Z.F.L.R. 157; Tozer v. Newcomb [1992] N.Z.F.L.R. 51.
74. Thea Brown et al., Revealing the Existence of Child Abuse in the Context of Marital
Breakdown and Custody and Access Disputes, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 849, 850 (2000).
75. Family Proceedings Act, 1980, § 45 (N.Z.).
76. Guardianship Act, 1968, § 16A (N.Z.).
77. M v. M [1984] 1 F.R.N.Z. 388.
78. Henry Plum, Proving Physical Abuse of Children, FAM. ADVOCATE 46, 49 (1995).
79. Family Proceedings Amendment Act, 1998 (N.Z.); Guardianship Act, 1968, § 30 (N.Z.).
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nation that the Domestic Violence Act of 1995 did not repeal section
59 of the Crimes Act 1961, the Family Court has also determined that
the anti-family violence provisions of the Guardianship Act have not
repealed section 59.80 This finding has not been made easily:
It is unfortunate that the legislature has not resolved the issue of
whether corporal punishment by parents is appropriate in New Zea-
land. It does seem that by retaining s.59 of the Crimes Act and enact-
ing s.16B, [the] legislature on the one hand is gaining the support of
those in the community who do not want corporal punishment, their
view being satisfied by s.16B, but at the same time retains the support
of those in the community who consider .. .[corporal] punishment
appropriate by retaining s.59.81
As in other civil proceedings, in custody cases, the presence of less
severe injuries such as bruising and the use of implements has been
held to be an unreasonable use of force in parental discipline. 2 This
determination has not been consistently applied, however. In Teutau
v. Teutau, Judge Mather determined that a mother who hit her child
causing "a limited amount of bruising" had not inflicted violence
within the meaning of section 16B of the Guardianship Act.8 3 Of
course, as in criminal proceedings, nothing within section 59 of the
Crimes Act 1961 prevents the Family Court from ever finding that a
parent who inflicts injuries on a child used reasonable disciplinary
force with no need for accountability.
IV. CARE AND PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS
The Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act of 1989
(CYPF Act of 1989) provides the authority for CYF to intervene in
suspected abuse cases. Unlike protection order and custody proceed-
ings which are initiated by private individuals, CYF is a state agency
initiating proceedings based on physical child abuse allegations. CYF
social workers or case managers are mandated to investigate reports
of abuse and neglect.' 4 A determination is made as to whether the
abuse is substantiated or unsubstantiated - that is, if the investigating
social worker or police officer "reasonably believes that the child or
young person ... is in need of care or protection.
85
Under section 14 of the CYPF Act of 1989, a number of reasons are
listed for which a child is considered in need of care and protection by
80. T v.T [1999] F.C. Auckland FP 004/919/90, 8-9.
81. Id. at 9.
82. Spence v. Spence [2000] F.C. Wellington FP 458/99; T v. T [1999] F.C. Auckland FP 004/
919/90, 10.
83. Teutau v. Teutau [1997] D.C. Otahuhu FP 048/191/96.
84. Children, Young Persons, & Their Families Act, 1989 § 17 (N.Z.).
85. Id. at § 17(2).
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the Family Court. The first of these is that "[tihe child or young per-
son is being, or is likely to be, harmed (whether physically, emotion-
ally or sexually), ill-treated, abused, or seriously deprived."86 In
corporal punishment cases, the operative words are abuse, ill-treat-
ment, and physical harm. Moreover, the term "using violence" is also
referred to regarding the power of the Court to make a restraining
order in a care and protection proceeding, which is distinct from the
term "causing physical harm. '8 7 Neither the CYPF Act of 1989 nor
the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Amendment Act of
1994 defines the terms abuse, ill-treatment, physical harm, or violence.
The "Joint NZCYPS/Police SAT Protocol" addresses "child sexual
and serious physical abuse."'8 8 Again, no definition of "serious" physi-
cal abuse is outlined in either the protocol or under the CYPF Act of
1989.89
Internal agency guidelines for social workers have described physi-
cal abuse as follows:
Physical abuse is any act or acts that result in inflicted injury to a child
or young person. It may include, but is not restricted to: bruises and
welts, cuts and abrasions, fractures or sprains, abdominal injuries,
head injuries, injuries to internal organs, strangulation or suffocation,
poisoning, [and] bums or scalds. Such injury or injuries may be delib-
erately inflicted or the unintentional result of rage. Regardless of mo-
tivation, the result for the child, young person, or person is physical
abuse. 9
0
Note that the infliction of pain is not listed. No court would be re-
quired to agree with these definitions of abuse, given that these are
internal agency guidelines and not statutory definitions. Some in the
Family Court have expressed concern that their interpretation of what
is abuse under section 14 is broader than "the rather more narrow
interpretations... made by the [Children and Young Persons] Service
when the Court makes referrals to it."'" In the United States, a lack
of statutory clarity in what constitutes physical child abuse, when it is
defined only in general terms, has been blamed for giving "too much
discretion to judges and child protective workers, who may make deci-
86. Id. at § 14(1)(a). A similar definition is given for "child abuse" under section 2 of the
Children, Young Persons and Their Families Amendment Act, 1994 (N.Z.).
87. Children, Young Persons, & Their Families Act, 1989, § 87(b) (N.Z.).
88. BREAKING THE CYCLE 7-3 (Children & Young Persons Serv., July 1996).
89. See Jeremy Robertson, Research on Family Group Conferences in Child Welfare in New
Zealand, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCES: PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY AND PRACTICE 49, 57-58
(Joe Hudson et al., eds., 1996).
90. CHILDREN, YOUNG PERSONS & THEIR FAMILIES SERV. (N.Z.), 1997, RECOGNITION OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: TIROHANGA TUKINO TAMARIK 14.
91. OFFICE OF THE COMMISSONER FOR CHILDREN (N.Z.), 1996, BRIEFING PAPER TO THE
MINISTER OF SOCIAL WELFARE 19.
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sions based on their own child-rearing strategies and impose their per-
sonal views on unwilling parents."92
A. The Parental Discipline Defense in Care and Protection
Proceedings
In physical child abuse cases involving a parental perpetrator, a so-
cial worker must take into consideration whether the parent's right to
use reasonable force under section 59 of the Crimes Act of 1961 pre-
vents the social worker from legally intervening, initiating care and
protection proceedings, or reporting the case to the police. Note that
most cases of physical abuse in New Zealand involve violence in the
home.93 Actions that might be considered abusive when committed
by a stranger upon a child may be justified when committed by a
parent.
Application of the parental discipline defense in care and protection
proceedings requires consideration of the same elements as its appli-
cation in criminal cases: the parent/child relationship, the motive of
correction, and the reasonable use of force.9" Yet, internal CYF
guidelines have stated that if certain injuries, including bruises and
welts, are the result of intentional force, then "[r]egardless of motiva-
tion, the result for the child, young person, or person is physical
abuse." 95 A conflict is present between statutory and agency ap-
proaches to physical abuse where motivation is relevant in one but not
the other. CYF has rationalized this conflict by defining ordinary
smacking, or "punishment designed to inflict physical pain," as "inap-
propriate at any age," but only abusive if used in a manner beyond
"societal norms."96
Section 59 of the Crimes Act of 1961 overrides certain determina-
tions of abuse, leading to the conclusion that a child is not in need of
care and protection because the substantiated "physical abuse" is jus-
tified. As in all other legal proceedings, the problem of ambiguity is
inherent in interpreting section 59 in care and protection proceedings.
The problem is compounded by the ambiguity of defining what consti-
tutes "abuse."
Yet, the Family Court in care and protection proceedings may be
providing a narrower interpretation of the parental discipline defense,
92. N. Dickon Reppucci & Carrie S. Fried, Child Abuse and the Law, 69 UMKC L. REV.
107, 109 (2000).
93. MINISTRY OF SOCIAL POLICY (N.Z.), THE SOCIAL REPORT 2001: TE PURONGO
ORANGA TANGATA, INDICATORS OF SOCIAL WELL-BEING IN NEW ZEALAND 38 (2001).
94. Crimes Act, 1961, § 59 (N.Z.).
95. CHILDREN, YOUNG PERSONS & THEIR FAMILIES SERV. (N.Z.), RECOGNITION OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: TIROHANGA TUKINO TAMARIK 14 (1997).
96. Id. at 56.
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similar to that found in domestic violence protection order proceed-
ings. For example, the Family Court has held that use of implements
and the presence of injury, including bruising, renders a parent's phys-
ical discipline'abusive.97 As Judge Moss stated: "[T]o describe the dis-
cipline as mild and conciliatory when it left the obvious marks
described is a distasteful under-statement. ' 98
At least one judicial decision in a care and protection proceeding
has resisted allowing the defense to even be raised. The Family Court
determined that there was no need to make a firm finding on whether
the parental discipline had been justified because "what is relevant is
how [the child] perceives her relationship with her mother to have
been and whether or not the mother is capable of acknowledging that
perception .... 99 The Court denied the parent a defense that must
be addressed if the facts warrant it, even if the parent does not wish to
raise it.'0°
If physical child abuse victims receive more sympathy in Family
Court, particularly in less severe corporal punishment cases, then ar-
guably this forum is best for such cases. Abandoning the ideal of
equal criminal justice for all family violence victims is perhaps justifia-
ble from a social context if the civil care and protection approach ade-
quately addresses the problem of physical child abuse. After all, child
victims of family violence have a separate child welfare agency to turn
to, an additional resource unavailable to adult family violence victims.
However, if parental perpetrators of violence regularly escaped crimi-
nal liability and the message of section 59 continued to promote the
use of force against children, one would sincerely hope that the child
welfare system in New Zealand could cope with the task.
B. The Benefits of the Care and Protection Approach
Aside from the possibly greater chance of overriding the parental
discipline defense in care and protection proceedings, a number of
other factors point to the advantages of Family Court over criminal
court in physical child abuse cases. While the CYPF Act of 1989 em-
phasizes the interests of the child and the interests of a child's "family,
whanau, hapu, iwi, and family group,"' 0 ' when these interests conflict,
97. I, T, M and J [2000] N.Z.F.L.R. 1089; NZFLR LEXIS 53, 31, 53-54. Case law in care
and protection proceedings which approve of less severe injuries has not been found by the
author.
98. Id. at 33.
99. Director-General of Social Welfare v. R [1997] 16 F.R.N.Z. 357, 361, 35.
100. See ADAMS ON CRIMINAL LAW, CA20.06, 31 (Hon. Bruce Robertson ed., 2nd student
ed., Brooker's, 1998).
101. Children, Young Persons, & Their Families Act, 1989, § 5(c) (N.Z.).
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the child's welfare is the "first and paramount consideration.' ' 10 2 In
criminal court, a victim's interests are often secondary to holding the
defendant accountable for his or her actions.
The CYPF Act of 1989 provides that the State should intervene in
family life as little as possible,"°3 including the preference for ex-
tended family and whanau placements if the child is removed from his
or her immediate family.1' 4 There are no similar statutory provisions
in criminal law which protect against the dangers of disrupting family
stability. Awareness of the needs of children and family members in
family violence matters have arisen in criminal cases only through the
training, experience and discretion of the judges and other profession-
als involved.
Where abuse is substantiated by CYF, the ongoing provision of ser-
vices and monitoring may be provided to the family even if no court
action is taken. No corresponding responsibility would attach to the
police in a criminal investigation. In care and protection proceedings,
if a child is deemed unsafe within the home environment, the child
may be made a ward of the court and/or removed from the home.0 5
The safety warrant providing for removal is granted when there are
"reasonable grounds" that the child is "suffering, or is likely to suffer,
ill-treatment, serious neglect, abuse, serious deprivation, or serious
harm."'1 6 Court ordered counseling for parent and child,0 7 services
for the family, 0 8 and limits on parental access to the child through
restraining orders,' 0 9 custody orders, 1 0 and guardianship orders"' are
more common dispositions than removal. Requirements of counsel-
ing, monitoring, and parenting classes are also common to both tradi-
tional and non-traditional criminal dispositions. The method of
determining criminal restorative justice dispositions is also similar to
the family group conference of the CYPF Act of 1989.
In making decisions and plans on behalf of the family and child, the
Family Group Conference adds the input of family members and
other non-professionals close to the child and suspected abuser. 12
The intended advantages of family group conferences over a court or
professionally controlled environment include: a sense of belonging,
102. Children, Young Persons, & Their Families Amendment Act, 1994, § 3 (N.Z.).
103. § 13(b)(ii).
104. § 13(g).
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cultural sensitivity, assumption of responsibility, increased motivation
to change, meaningfulness, increased self-confidence, giving parties a
voice, reparation, truth, privacy through closed hearings, and effec-
tiveness through a more tailored proceeding and plan.'13
Under the CYPF Act of 1989, the paramountcy principle allows the
Family Court to consider many more factors than the criminal court in
determining a proper resolution. "In proceedings where the para-
mount consideration is the welfare of a child, rather than the rights of
litigants in a criminal or civil context, it is both important and proper
that all evidence which may be of assistance should be available, it
being left to the Court to assess that evidence in conjunction with al
of the other evidence in the case.""' 4 In the best interests of the child,
the Family Court Judge can look to the overall family environment,
including past incidents of abuse, when determining where the child
should live." 5
Another important distinction between civil and criminal eviden-
tiary requirements is that children may be less likely to be required to
testify in Family Court proceedings than as victim witnesses in a crimi-
nal trial." 6 For the purpose of care and protection hearings, a Family
Court has the power to receive any evidence which the Court thinks
fit, whether otherwise admissible or not.1 7 Therefore, despite a tape's
non-compliance with the Evidence (Videotaping of Child Complain-
ants) Regulations of 1990 excluding its use in a criminal trial, it could
be admitted in a care and protection proceeding.18
As in most civil cases, the burden of proof in Family Court in deter-
mining whether a child is in need of care and protection is based on
the lower burden of the balance of probabilities rather than the higher
criminal burden of beyond a reasonable doubt." 9 Nevertheless, the
Family Court has asserted that it is "necessary that the allegation of
113. See Ian Hassall, Origin and Development of Family Group Conferences, in FAMILY
GROUP CONFERENCES: PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY AND PRACTICE 17, 31-32 (Joe Hudson et al.,
eds., The Federation Press, Annandale (NSW), 1996).
114. P v. B [1994] N.Z.F.L.R. 381.
115. See I, T, M and J [2000] N.Z.F.L.R. 1089; NZFLR LEXIS 53, 35, para 62 (mother
testified father's physical punishment of their children was a "regular event").
116. According to David Howden, a Wellington family lawyer for over fifteen years, young
children are rarely if ever called into Family Court to give evidence. Interview with David
Howden (Wellington, March 2, 2001). See also Australian Law Reform Comm'n, SEEN AND
HEARD: PRIORITY FOR CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL PROCESS: ALRC 84, 302-303 (Australian
Government Publishing Serv., 1986).
117. Children, Young Persons, & Their Families Act, 1989, § 195 (N.Z.).
118. See P v. B [1994] N.Z.F.L.R. 381.
119. Re H [1996] 2 W.L.R. 8 (civil balance of probabilities applied in care and protection
proceedings); Domestic Violence Act, 1995, § 85 (N.Z.) (balance of probabilities standard of
proof in protection order proceedings). But see Michael Freeman, The Convention: An English
Perspective in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 93, 99 (Michael Freeman
ed., Dartmouth Publishing, 1996) (citing Re M [1994] 1 F.L.R. 59; and Re P [1994] 2 F.L.R. 751
19
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physical abuse is proved to a standard at the top end of the scale of
the balance of probabilities."' 20 However, even if the party responsi-
ble for the abuse is not determined, the Family Court may find the
child in need of care and protection.12 1 Again, this displays the para-
mountcy principle that the child's best interests are of most concern.
Thus, the civil care and protection system offers a number of advan-
tages over the criminal justice system on behalf of physical child abuse
victims, including a possibly greater belief that physical injury to chil-
dren should not be justified under section 59 of the Crimes Act of
1961. Also, unlike the other civil proceedings, which are matters of
private litigation, the civil care and protection approach allows the
State to intervene on behalf of any child at risk of parental physical
abuse.
C. Lack of Resources
Despite all of the ideal benefits of care and protection proceedings
and their focus on the best interests of the child, such benefits cannot
be fully realized unless sufficient resources exist. Unfortunately, as is
the case in much of the world, 22 the child welfare agencies of New
Zealand have indicated for some time that resources are seriously
lacking. 123
The Child Welfare Act of 1925 led to the 1950s professionalization
of social workers along with an explosion of caseloads between 1948
and 1972.124 In 1988, Mary Todd of New Zealand's Department of
Social Welfare noted that reports of abuse were increasing at a rate
that put great pressure on individual social workers and training re-
(holding that the civil standard of proof was increased where child abuse was at issue in order to
protect parents' rights).
120. I, T, M and J [2000] NZFLR 1089; NZFLR LEXIS 53, 55, 32.
121. Children, Young Persons, & Their Families Act, 1989, § 71(b) (N.Z.).
122. For example, in England social service departments have made repeated pleas for in-
creased resources due to case overloads. Michael Freeman, The Convention: An English Per-
spective in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 93, 99 (Michael Freeman ed.,
Dartmouth Publishing, 1996). See also Christian Wolmar, The horrific death of eight-year-old
Anna Climbie provides yet more evidence of the critical state of Britain's social services, THE
INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY (UK), January 14, 2001, at 14. For discussion of similar resource
problems in the United States of America see Desmond K. Runyan, The Emotional Impact of
Societal Intervention into Child Abuse, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING
AND IMPROVING TESTIMONY 263 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., The Guildford
Press, 1993).
123. For a recent, thorough review of the New Zealand agency Child, Youth and Family,
including the lack of resources see Michael J. Brown, CARE AND PROTECTION IS ABOUT ADULT
BEHAVIOUR: THE MINISTERIAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILD, YoUTH AND FAMILY
SERV. (Report to the Hon. Steve Maharey, Dec. 2000) available at http://www.mosp.govt.nz/
publications/docs/mickbrownreview.pdf"
124. BRONWYN DALLEY, FAMILY MATTERS: CHILD WELFARE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
NEW ZEALAND 163, 172 (Auckland University Press, 1998).
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sources. 12  Between 1996 and 1999, care and protection notifications
increased by 12%, while youth justice referrals remained steady.126 In
March 2001, approximately 4000 reports of New Zealand children at
risk of abuse and neglect had not been investigated by CYF.127
Alarmingly, the notifications have not only increased in volume, but
also in "the level of complex and multiple needs presented by these
clients, and hence in the cost associated with providing services.' 128
At a child rights conference in 2000, Government Minister Steve
Maharey stated that "Child, Youth and Family over the last ten years
has been run into the ground.' 1 9
In the 1980s, the Department of Social Welfare lacked resources in
the provision of specialist services, such as psychological services,'130 as
well as funding for foster care training. 3' A 1990s analysis of services
provided under the CYPF Act of 1989 indicates that funding limita-
tions continue to hinder the adequate provision of services. 132 CYF's
costs were 17% over their Purchase Agreement level in 1999.13 In
the year 2000, CYF reported a shortage of at least 2000 foster
parents.13
4
With regard to family group conferences, the Human Rights Com-
mission in 1992 stated its greatest concern regarding the CYPF Act of
1989 was a lack of resources to implement the Act's measures, includ-
ing family group conferences and the monitoring and follow-up re-
quired.135 Delays in the family group process and funding for the
125. 2 CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION IN NEW ZEALAND REVISITED 17 (Max Abbot & Dell
Braun eds., Mental Health Found. of N.Z., Dec. 1988).
126. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD, YoUH & FAMILY SERV. (N.Z.), THE OVERVIEW: POsT-ELEC-
TION BRIEFING 1999, 15 (1999).
127. Leah Haines, CYFS defending 16 personal grievance cases, THE DOMINION, March 24,
2001, at 2 (citing Jackie Brown, Chief Executive of Child, Youth & Family (N.Z.)). See also
MICHAEL J. BROWN, CARE AND PROTECTION IS ABOUT ADULT BEHAVIOUR: THE MINISTERIAL
REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILD, YOUTH AND FAMILY SERV. 68 (Report to the Hon.
Steve Maharey, December 2000).
128. DEPT. OF CHILD, YOUTH & FAMILY SERV. (N.Z.), THE OVERVIEW: POST-ELECTION
BRIEFING 1999, 20 (1999).
129. Hon. Steve Maharey, Minister for Social Serv. (N.Z.), Address at the "Children's
Needs, Rights and Welfare: Developing Strategies for the 'Whole Child' in the 21st Century"
conference, University of Waikato (Nov. 30, 2000).
130. 2 CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION IN NEW ZEALAND REVISITED 17 (Max Abbot & Dell
Braun eds., Mental Health Found. of N.Z., Dec. 1988).
131. See id. at 18.
132. Ian Shirley et al., New Zealand, in 1 FAMILY CHANGE AND FAMILY POLICIES IN GREAT
BRITAIN, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES 207, 285 (Sheila B. Kamerman &
Alfred J. Kahn eds., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997).
133. THE OVERVIEW: POST-ELECrION BREFING 1999, 15 (Department of Child, Youth and
Family Serv. (N.Z.), 1999).
134. Mary Longmore, Shortage desperate, says foster parent group head, THE EVENING POST,
Oct. 6 2000, at 2.
135. David Swain, Family Group Conferences in Child Care and Protection and in Youth
Justice in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 9 INT'L J. L. & FAM. 155, 173 (1995). See Alison Morris et al.,
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bureaucracy needed to organize them have led to lesser forms of
"family meetings" being upgraded to the status of family group
conferences. 136 In 1999, CYF confirmed that its resources were
insufficient to implement the plans developed in family group
conferences. 137
High turnover of social workers is an unfortunate result of some of
these problems. CYF faces difficulties in both recruiting and retaining
skilled staff.138 In 1996, New Zealand's social workers from the Chil-
dren, Young Persons and Their Families Services had a 13.5% national
turnover of social workers, including a 22% turnover in Auckland. 39
Nationally, these figures rose to 15.4% in January 2001.14°
Some schools have noted that CYF responds less and less to general
neglect cases, focusing primarily on sexual and physical abuse cases.' 4'
However, most physical abuse cases involve less severe injuries such
as bruising, 4 1 and one Auckland judge has recognized that CYF is
unable to attend to them: "[A]ny referral under ... [the Children,
Young Persons and Their Families] Act would be completely inappro-
priate, if only because of the lack of resources available to the Chil-
dren, Young Persons and Their Families Funding Agency to deal with
a case of this sort.' '1 43
Regardless of its persistent need for funding, CYF is continually
called upon to become even more involved while using existing re-
sources. More preventative efforts are sought to alleviate the current
pattern where social workers are only able to provide an "ambulance
service" for abused and neglected children. The 1954 Special Com-
mittee recommendations to the New Zealand Parliament for legal re-
form relating to children included a proposed amendment to the Child
Concluding Thoughts, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCES: PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY AND PRAC-
TICE 221, 231 (Joe Hudson et al. eds., The Federation Press, Annandale (NSW), 1996);
GABRIELLE MAXWELL ET AL., Focus ON CHILDREN: REPORTS ON CONSULTATION, PHASE 1
AND PHASE 2 OF THE SOUTH CANTERBURY PROJECT 13 (Office of the Commissioner for Chil-
dren (N.Z.), October 1996).
136. Swain, at 175. See Jeremy Robertson, Research on Family Group Conferences in Child
Welfare in New Zealand, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCES: PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY AND
PRACTICE 57, 58 (Joe Hudson et al. eds., The Federation Press, 1996).
137. DEPT. OF CHILD, YOUTH & FAMILY SERV. (N.Z.), STRATEGIC ISSUES: POsT-ELECTION
BRIEFING 1999, 8 (1999).
138. Id. at 25.
139. Id.
140. Leah Haines, CYFS defending 16 personal grievance cases, THE DOMINION, 24 March
2001, at 2 (citing Jackie Brown, Chief Executive of Child, Youth & Family).
141. GABRIELLE MAXWELL ET AL., OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR CHILDREN (N.Z.),
FOCUS ON CHILDREN: REPORTS ON CONSULTATION, PHASE 1 AND PHASE 2 OF THE SOUTH CAN-
TERBURY PROJECT 7 (1996).
142. See app., "Year 2000 Physical Child Abuse Reports from the Porirua Police Department
in New Zealand."
143. T v. T [1999] F.C. Auckland FP 004/919/90, 14.
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Welfare Act of 1925 for more preventative work."' In 1999, Jackie
Brown, Chief Executive of Child, Youth and Family Services, stated
that the department's focus on child protection would be on "earlier
interventions ... before a crisis point is reached."'14 5 While the ideal
of prevention is worthy, considering the current lack of resources to
cope with children who are already victims, particularly children who
are injured by their parents' corporal punishment, one must question
where the additional funds will come from. 1 4 6
While some speculate about the economic and political changes
which may have caused this lack of resources, 47 and some may won-
der whether the inadequacy of funding will continue, the underlying
point is that the deficit does exist and has existed for decades. If CYF
is not given the financial support to fully apply the CYPF Act of 1989,
then only the most severe physical abuse cases are likely to result in
civil legal actions. Most cases of physical abuse, where children re-
ceive bruises and welts from "less severe" physical discipline, are not
likely to receive many social services even if the cases are reported. If
few services and little monitoring are provided in this most common
form of physical child abuse, and criminal accountability is not often
demanded, then many New Zealand children injured by their parents'
discipline are left without protection in either civil or criminal forums.
That the civil care and protection system needs assistance while the
criminal courts are increasingly sensitive to family violence issues begs
the question: Why have police and social workers hesitated to con-
sider the criminal courts a proper forum for cases of family violence
against children?
V. REFORM AND REPEAL OF THE PARENTAL DISCIPLINE DEFENSE
The breadth and flexibility of the legal reasonableness standard cre-
ates a potential for longevity clearly borne out by the centuries old
common law parental discipline defense to the use of force by a par-
ent against a child. Today, however, the parental right to physically
punish a child is in question throughout the world. While some judges
and juries may currently hold that children deserve their bruises and
welts from slaps, punches, jug cords, and belts, fewer and fewer gov-
144. N.Z. PARLIAMENTARY SPECIAL Comm., REPORT ON MORAL DELINQUENCY IN CluI-
DREN AND ADOLESCENTS, at 58 (RE Owen, Government Printer, 1954).
145. DEPT. OF CHILD, YOUTH & FAMILY SERV., THE OVERVIEW: POST-ELECTION BRIEFING
1999, foreword (1999).
146. Note that in June 2001, NZ$216 million of government funds was set aside as a "rescue
package" for Child, Youth and Family. Leah Haines, $216m rescue plan starts for Child, Youth
and Family, THE DOMINION, June 14, 2001, at 7.
147. See Ian Shirley et al., New Zealand, in 1 FAMILY CHANGE AND FAMILY POLICIES IN
GREAT BRITAIN, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES 207, 284 (Sheila B.
Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds., Clarendon Press, 1997).
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ernments comfortably embrace the state-endorsed adage: "Spare the
rod and spoil the child."
In consideration of the inconsistent application of, and human
rights concerns with, the parental discipline defense, increasingly,
courts and legislatures around the world are either restricting or abol-
ishing it. Very little research is available regarding the nations that
have "abolished" or are in the process of abolishing the right of par-
ents to corporally punish children.'" In addition, most discussions of
these nations fail to explain what the legal impact is regarding en-
forcement, such as what sanctions apply and how the ban interacts
with civil and criminal law.149
Following a different approach, a number of British Commonwealth
nations, including New Zealand, and several American states have re-
stricted or are now considering restricting the parental discipline de-
fense. Yet, none has repealed the defense altogether. Statutory
restrictions define what is reasonable and what is not reasonable
force,' 50 such as prohibiting certain types of injuries, the use of imple-
ments, striking vulnerable areas of the body such as the head, or strik-
ing very young children.
For example, in January 2004 the Canada Supreme Court recently
narrowed the defense by prohibiting corporal punishment to children
under the age of two and over twelve, the use of implements, and the
application of disciplinary force to the head or face.' 5 ' In New Zea-
land, Bob Simcock of the the National Party has introduced a Mem-
ber's Bill to amend section 59 by excluding a parent's right to use
force that would cause "internal or external bruising, swelling, cuts,
burns or more serious injuries."' 52 However, the widest variety of re-
148. One exception is research on legal reform in Sweden, led by Joan Durrant. See Joan
Durrant, Legal Reform and Attitudes toward Physical Punishment in Sweden, 2003 THE INT'L J.
OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 147.
149. Susan Bitensky has provided the best research on the legal structure and effect of the
"bans" on parental corporal punishment internationally. However, she focuses more on the
symbolic human rights message rather than the impact on victims and perpetrators which limits
her discussion on implementation of reform. See Susan H. Bitensky, The Role of Law in Abol-
ishing Corporal Punishment of Children (1998) (submitted to the Ending Physical Punishment of
Children in Europe conference); Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity;
Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 353 (1998); Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Human Rights: International
Law's Mandate against all Corporal Punishment of Children, 21 WHITER L. REV. 147 (1999).
150. For a general summary of the arguments advocating a restricting approach see Kandice
K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense - Reasonable and
Necessary, or Excused Abuse? U. ILL. L. REV. 413 (1998); and Scott A. Davidson, Note, When
is Parental Discipline Child Abuse? The Vagueness of Child Abuse Laws 34 U. LOUISVILLE J.
FAM. LAW 403 (1995-96).
151. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General)
(2004). For the text of the decision, see www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/fr/pub/2004/voll/
index.html.
152. E-mail from Bob Simcock, M.P. to the author (October 16, 2001).
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strictions may be found in the United States of America.153 The im-
pact of reform of the defense will have vast practical repercussions on
civil approaches to physical child abuse, including the basic determi-
nation of what constitutes child abuse or domestic violence against a
child. In addition, reform may aid governments in better aligning
criminal and civil family violence policies.
A. Types of Restrictions
The Model Penal Code produced by the American Law Institute
currently recommends a form of the defense restricted by risk of se-
vere injury. Force by parents against minors in their care is justified if:
"(a) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the
welfare of the minor, including the prevention or punishment of his
misconduct; and (b) the force used is not designed to cause or known
to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily harm, dis-
figurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross degradation;
1154
Note that "reasonableness" is not an element in the Model Code. The
reasonable purpose and the unreasonable risks have been set out
instead.
In the American jurisdictions which have adopted the Code, the
prohibition against serious bodily harm has had limited effect. Mili-
tary court applications of the Model Penal Code approach have indi-
cated that it "allow[s] parental conduct that causes bruising on a
child's buttocks and legs when the parent had a proper parental pur-
pose and the bruises were unintended." '155 Similarly, a Hawaiian ap-
plication of the Model Penal Code found that the presence of three
inch wide and five inch long bruises and welts caused by a leather belt,
lasting about a week on a child's legs, did not come "anywhere near"
the risks of injury set out in (b) above nor as a matter of law did it
indicate serious pain. 56 Nigeria's statutory prohibition against severe
injury within the parental discipline defense has also come into criti-
cism because it continues to allow the defense in very serious cases.1 57
153. For the most comprehensive overview of the parental discipline defenses in the United
States, see Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment De-
fense - Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse? U. ILL. L. REV. 413 (1998).
154. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (1999).
155. Major Barham, Sparing the Rod: The Parental Discipline Defense in the Military, ARMY
LAWYER, Aug. 1993 at 40, 42. The article cites U.S. v. Scofield, 33 M.J. 857 (ACMR 1991).
156. State v. Deleon, 813 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Haw. 1991).
157. Criminal Code Act (1916) (Nig.) authorizes parents, teachers, and those in loco parentis
to inflict a "blow or other force" to correct children under age 16. Nigeria's Penal Code, section
55, states: "[a] blow or other force, not in any case extending to a wound or grievous harm, may
be justified for the purpose of correcting a child by his parents ...." See Emeka Chianu, Two
deaths, one blind eye, one imprisonment. Child Abuse in the Guise of Corporal Punishment in
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Other restrictions have attempted to protect against a wider range
of harm against children. For example, in the State of Washington,
the parental discipline defense is presumed unreasonable if it involves:
[T]hrowing, kicking, burning, cutting, striking with a closed fist, shak-
ing a child under 3, interfering with breathing, threatening with a
deadly weapon, [or] any other act likely to cause and which does cause
bodily harm greater than transient pain or minor temporary marks.' 58
One of the challenges in restricting the defense by injury is that a
certain degree of force must be allowed. An attempt at accommodat-
ing this, particularly when mild bruising or pain is to be protected, is a
provision allowing for transient or temporary minor injuries, as seen
in the Washington example above. In 2001, in New South Wales, the
Crimes Amendment (Child Protection Physical Mistreatment) Act
limited the common law reasonable discipline defense to the applica-
tion of force, "unless that force could reasonably be considered trivial
or negligible in all the circumstances," which excludes force "likely to
cause harm to the child that lasts for more than a short period.
159
This creates concerns of vagueness and inconsistent interpretation.
While the stated purpose of the Bill was to prevent excessive punish-
ment, critics claim its ambiguity renders it an anti-smacking bill.160
Regarding defining a "short period of time," Reverend the
Honourable FJ Nile argued:
What does that mean? The original bill made reference to children
experiencing a tingling feeling, or something like that. Someone will
have to determine whether a short period is five seconds, 30 seconds
or one minute. If a child experiences harm for more than five seconds
his or her parents could be in trouble with the law.
161
Non-"transient" injury could very easily be the sharp pain inflicted by
a smack.
Given the complications of defining unreasonable force by statute,
particularly injury, it would be tempting to simply limit the defense to
common assault, and amend the parental discipline defense such that
it no longer applies to criminal charges or civil liability with elements
which involve the risk or infliction of injury. However, a number of
Nigerian Schools, 24(7) CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1005, 1006 (2000); and Eunice Uzodike, Child
Abuse and Neglect in Nigeria - Socio-legal Aspects, 4(1) INT'L J. L. & FAM. 83, 86-87 (1990).
158. WASH. REV. CODE ANN., § 9A.16.100 (2005). See also ARK. CODE ANN § 9-27-
303(3)(A)(vi) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 468 (2004).
159. The Crimes Amendment (Child Protection Physical Mistreatment) Act, § 61AA(2)
(2001) (NSW).
160. (NSW) Crimes Amendment (Child Protection-Physical Mistreatment) Bill 2001 (the se-
lect committee reports, Second Reading) 5911, The Hon MI Jones [3.59pm].
161. (NSW) Crimes Amendment (Child Protection-Physical Mistreatment) Bill 2001 (the se-
lect committee reports, Second Reading) 5911, Rev the Hon FJ Nile [4.06pm].
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cases involving injuries are currently being charged as or pled down to
common assault, so this approach would have limited effect.
Another approach to allow some force but not all is to specify what
methods of corporal punishment are permissible. Oklahoma recently
passed legislation which added to its parental discipline defense that it
is reasonable for corporal punishment to involve "the use of ordinary
force, including but not limited to, spanking, switching or
paddling."' 62
In another approach restricting the parental discipline defense, the
English government has proposed outlining by statute the factors to
consider when determining reasonable force, including: "the nature
and context of the treatment; its duration; its physical and mental ef-
fects; and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the
victim."' 63 In Australia, New South Wales is reviewing a Bill that
would require consideration of the "age, health, maturity or other
characteristics of the child, the nature of the alleged misbehaviour or
other circumstances.' 164
England is also considering provisions which state that certain
forms of punishment are per se unreasonable, such as the use of im-
plements and blows to the head. 165 Note that in 1992, the Scottish
Law Commission Report on Family Law recommended legislation
prohibiting the use of implements in physical discipline and acts caus-
ing or risking injury or pain "lasting more than a very short time";
however, this approach was rejected by the Scottish Government. 166
Scotland has now taken a position very similar to England's, except it
adds provisions against the shaking of children.' 67 Nigeria prohibits
the use of disciplinary force on children too young to understand the
purpose for which the punishment is inflicted. 168
162. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10 § 7106(A)(3) (2005) (regarding DHS investigations of child abuse).
163. DEPT. OF HEALTH (ENG.), PROTECTING CHILDREN, SUPPORTING PARENTS: A CONSUL-
TATION DOCUMENT ON THE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN 13, 5.3 (2000).
164. (NSW) Crimes Amendment (Child Protection-Physical Mistreatment) Bill 2001, Sched
1[11, cl1(b).
165. DEPT. OF HEALTH (ENG.), PROTECTING CHILDREN, SUPPORTING PARENTS: A CONSUL-
TATION DOCUMENT ON THE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN 14, 5.7 (2000). Note that the
New South Wales Legislative Council has rejected a proposal to ban the use of implements in the
parental discipline defense, but has approved prohibiting blows to the head and neck. Crimes
Amendment (Child Protection-Physical Mistreatment) Bill 2001, Sched 1[1].
166. THE SCOT. EXECUTIVE JUSTICE DEPT. THE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN IN
SCOTLAND: A CONSULTATION 1.5 (2000).
167. Id. at 5.9. Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, § 51 (2003).
168. Eunice Uzodike, Child Abuse and Neglect in Nigeria - Socio-legal Aspects, 4(1) INT'L J.
L. & FAM. 83, 86-87 (1990). See also the proposal to prohibit corporal punishment on children
under age five in Judge Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 983, 1020-1021 (1996).
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Another method of restricting the defense would be to legally de-
fine what is meant by corporal punishment. Providing a definition
could provide clarification to both professionals who enforce the law
and the public who must abide by it. An example of a statutory defi-
nition of corporal punishment is that which relates to England's prohi-
bition on corporal punishment within residential care facilities:
[A]ny intentional application of force as punishment including slap-
ping, throwing missiles and rough handling. It would also include
punching or pushing in the heat of the moment in response to violence
from young people. It does not prevent a person taking necessary
physical action, where any other course of action would be likely to
fail, to avert an immediate danger of personal injury to the child or
another person, or to avoid immediate danger to property.
169
Although it is superfluous to exclude actions that are already ex-
cluded by defenses such as self-defense, defense of property, and ne-
cessity, providing such a definition may serve as a reminder that such
defenses would still apply to parents.
A wide variety of statutory restrictions on the parental discipline
defense is possible. Whether they are effective in eliminating the
problems of the defense, or simply compound them is a matter of
concern.
B. The Rationale for Restricting rather than Repealing the Defense
The proposals to restrict the parental discipline defense have prima-
rily been motivated by a desire to prevent the defense from protecting
physically injurious actions against children. In the best article advo-
cating a restricting approach, Kandice Johnson asserts that "the great-
est problem emanating from the parental privilege to use disciplinary
force is that in an attempt to accommodate traditional disciplinary
practices, current standards hedge on the issue of whether parents can
physically injure their child."17 Another purpose of restricting the
defense is to grant greater protections to parents for minor assaults by
implying that non-injurious corporal punishment is protected because
injurious corporal punishment is not. This grants greater protection to
parents than a vague "reasonable" standard, which could be inter-
preted as either pro or anti-parental rights. 171
However, the restricting approach to reform of the parental disci-
pline defense may also simply be a compromise to appease both pa-
rental rights and child rights advocates. The English Government's
169. 1 CLARKE HALL & MORRISON ON CHILDREN 1 1809 (Butterworths, updated Sept.
2000).
170. Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense
- Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 413, 418.
171. See id. at 475.
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current position rejects consideration of a ban on all forms of physical
punishment of children, in part because public opinion surveys do not
support such a position. 172 Similarly, the Scottish Executive's position
is that "mild physical rebukes" of children are normal and acceptable
in families, thus a ban on all forms of smacking would be inappropri-
ate.173 Moreover, according to the English Government, a ban
"would be intrusive and incompatible with our aim of helping and en-
couraging parents in their role"'1 74 - that is, it would be too heavy
handed. In addition, the Government expressed concern that there
would be no guarantee that charges would not be brought in minor
cases, 175 but failed to mention existing internal police charging poli-
cies, which filter out non-injury cases when charging assault in
general.
Concern for public sentiment regarding reform options is also ap-
parent in New Zealand. Minister Steve Maharey has stated with re-
gard to any reform of section 59, "[B]efore we change the law, we
really need . . . to lay the scene for changes in the way that other
countries have done.... Law very seldom works if it runs ahead of the
way people think.' '1 76
C. Concerns with the Restriction Approach
Several concerns exist regarding the option of restricting rather
than repealing the parental discipline defense. If the restrictions are
not specific enough, then the previous breadth of the defense is main-
tained. One could argue setting out general factors like consideration
of the "physical and mental effects" as recommended by the English
proposal is one example of this. In a criticism of the 1992 Scottish
Law Commission proposals for restricting the parental discipline de-
fense, the Irish Law Reform Commission argued: "It is unclear, how-
ever, whether the Scottish proposal fully overcomes the problem of
subjectivity - an 'ordinary safe smack' or 'pain lasting more than a
very short time' are both subjective concepts.' '1 77 Thus, the Irish Law
Reform Commission in 1993, although agreeing the parental discipline
172. DEvr. OF HEALTH (ENG.), PROTECTING CHILDREN, SUPPORTING PARENTS: A CONSUL-
TATION DOCUMENT ON THE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN 2.14 (Jan. 2000).
173. THE SCOT. ExEcrvE JusTIcE DEPT., THE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN IN
SCOTLAND: A CONSULTATION 1.8 (2000).
174. DEPT. OF HEALTH (ENG.), PROTECTING CHILDREN, SUPPORTING PARENTS: A CONSUL-
TATION DOCUMENT ON THE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN 2.14 (2000).
175. Id.
176. Hon. Steve Maharey, Minister for Social Services (N.Z.), Address at the "Children's
Needs, Rights and Welfare: Developing Strategies for the 'Whole Child' in the 21st Century"
Conference, University of Waikato (Nov. 30, 2000).
177. IR. LAW REFORM COMM'N, NON-FATAL OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON, 126 (1993).
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defense was outdated, decided to abandon reform because the re-
stricting approach was unworkable. 178
Even when bruising is prohibited, a recent care and protection case
in Massachusetts highlighted the problem of defining bruising. Strik-
ing a child with a leather belt was not abusive and did not cause a
substantial risk of harm, according to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, when the result was pink marks on the child's buttocks
which faded within ten minutes. 1 79 The risk of physical injury in this
case was that the statutory definition includes "soft tissue swelling or
skin bruising."' 180 Had the definition included pain, then the court
may have upheld the care and protection determination that abuse
had taken place.
Prohibiting grievous injury within the parental discipline defense as
in the American Model Penal Code makes little practical difference in
most cases if the vast majority of cases involve less severe injuries such
as bruises and welts. Moreover, it makes little recognition of the hu-
manitarian gains of Western society, where in the early 1800s in the
United States of America, a slave-master could raise the reasonable
discipline defense, limited only in that: "the master has not the right
to slay his slave, or inflict upon him what the law calls great bodily
harm, to wit, maiming or dismembering him, or such punishment as
puts his life in great and useless peril."''
In contrast, if the restrictions are too specific, it could make parents
self-conscious and confused about what they can and cannot do. As
stated by the spokesperson for the National Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) in England: "Playing around with
legal definitions of how and in what circumstances children can be hit
is a recipe for confusion and fear for parents and keeps children at
risk."' 82 In Utah, Republican State Senator Glad commented when
voting against a bill to restrict the parental discipline defense by
prohibiting and defining injury:
I really struggled with this bill ... I felt like if I had a child I would
have to put these new parameters on the wall above their bed and
then I'd have to try and figure out what they mean. I felt like we had
created an almost impossible task.183
178. Id. at 289, 9.214.
179. Donald R. Cobble, Jr. v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Social Serv., 719 N.E.2d 500
(Mass. 1999).
180. Id. at 505.
181. See Jacob v. State, 22 Tenn. 493 (Tenn. 1842) (master repeatedly hitting slave about the
head with a stick determined to be reasonable discipline).
182. Parents Retain Right to Smack, (BBC News broadcast, January 18, 2000).
183. Jennifer Dobner, DESERET NEWS, February 27, 2001 <http://nospank.org/n-h40.htm>
Utah HB 387 (amended 22 February 2001) passed in the House, but failed in the Senate.
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The Scottish Executive has expressed the concern that listing unac-
ceptable punishments is misleading to the public because it "could be
taken to imply that other kinds [of inappropriate punishment] are ac-
ceptable."'" Indeed, it would be essential in such a defense to include
an open-ended clause stating that any other practice, which endangers
or could endanger the safety and well-being of the child, is also pro-
hibited. Of course, this revives the concerns with the term reasonable
in the parental discipline defense - that is, the vagueness of the de-
fense risks inconsistent application and fails to protect children. This
problem almost necessitates the inclusion of what is acceptable as well
as what is not, which could result in unsavory statutory language: it is
acceptable to strike a child on the legs and arms; it is acceptable to
slap a child; it is acceptable to repeatedly strike a child as long as no
marks emerge on the child's body.
If the presence of obvious injuries and marks provides the line when
the State can intervene, then children whose injuries are not immedi-
ately apparent may be at risk because social workers and police of-
ficers would be inhibited or prevented from stepping in without such
obvious signs. Severe and potentially fatal injuries are not always visi-
ble.'85 Confirmation of the presence of fractures often requires an x-
ray.186 Good intentions motivate proposals to restrict the defense, but
this approach is not practicable or effective. Signs of internal injuries
may be merely pain or vomiting. 87 Head injuries, which are noted to
be the most common cause of death from physical abuse, may only be
detected by signs of irritability or drowsiness. 88
As stated by Blackstone over a century ago:
[T]he law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence,
and therefore prohibits the first and lowest stage of it; every man's
person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it, in
any the slightest manner.' 89
While repeal of the parental discipline defense creates anxiety
about the resulting application of the broad assault laws against par-
ents, the assault laws are broad for a reason. The public legal state-
ment within the offense of common assault upholds the right of
everyone to be free from the use of force and violence by others.
Children need and deserve to be included in its protections. Yet par-
184. THE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN IN SCOTLAND: A CONSULTATION 5.8 (The
Scottish Executive Justice Dept., Feb. 2000).
185. CHILDREN, YOUNG PERSONS & THEIR FAMILIES SERV. (N.Z.), RECOGNITION OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: TIROHANGA TUKINO TAMARIK 19 (1997).
186. Id. at 43.
187. Id. at 44.
188. Id.
189. Blackstone's Comm. 3, 120 cited in Collins v. Wilcock, 3 All E.R. 374, 378 (1984).
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ents have a right and a duty to raise and discipline their children.
How can the law protect parents in their exercise of this right? Even a
"time-out" in a certain location may require a degree of force to lead
the child to that location.
In both criminal and civil proceedings, several important and well
established defenses to assault remain available to parents, including
necessity, self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property.
Proof of provocation may mitigate sentencing. In addition, the maxim
de minimis non curat lex prevents a minor non-injury technical assault,
such as a push, from creating liability for assault, just as it does in
adult victim cases. Guardians and caretakers of adults with cognitive
and developmental disabilities who may not be willing or able to co-
operate with the directions of their caretakers have long survived with
such defenses to assault without the need for a specialized parental
discipline defense. Hopefully, most would agree that striking an inco-
herent and defiant elderly adult with a belt as punishment for not eat-
ing or for wetting his or her pants would be inhumane and a criminal
assault. An adult who similarly strikes a three-year-old child should
be held accountable under the law.
In Texas, defenses to assault exist for both guardians of "incompe-
tents"'190 and parents of children19' when the force is "necessary" to
safeguard and promote the welfare of the person cared for. The de-
fense of "necessity" in Texas states that conduct is justified if
(1) [T]he actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately neces-
sary to avoid imminent harm; (2) the desirability and urgency of avoid-
ing the harm clearly outweigh, according to ordinary standards of
reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscrib-
ing the conduct; and (3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justifica-
tion claimed for the conduct does not otherwise plainly appear.' 92
As with self-defense and defense of others, the proportionality re-
quirement of the defense of necessity includes an internal safeguard to
the use of force, rather than an open-ended "right" to assault another
as found in the common law parental discipline defense. Use of the
overbroad discipline defense or miscellaneous restricted versions of it
against children is now outmoded in an age which does not justify
deliberately causing pain or injury to persons for the purposes of disci-
pline, whether it is to an inmate, a prisoner of war, a "servant," or a
spouse.
190. TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.63.
191. TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.61.
192. TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.22 (emphasis added).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Family Court in New Zealand struggles with the ambi-
guity of the parental discipline defense, it has been shown to be willing
to find the injury of children an unreasonable use of force under sec-
tion 59 of the Crimes Act of 1961. CYF investigations and legal pro-
ceedings provide what many might see as the ideal approach to
parental physical discipline cases. The intent of a care and protection
approach is to look to the best interests of children and help families
avoid the stresses that might have instigated the excessive discipline in
the first place. Unfortunately, the agency's ability to effectuate these
goals is severely limited by a lack of resources, particularly in physical
abuse cases, which usually tend to involve less severe injuries.
Even despite the lack of resources, reliance on care and protection
proceedings and the services of CYF is not ideal in every respect.
With a focus on the child victim, the risk to the community is ne-
glected. Criminal law holds the interests of community safety at the
fore by making a public declaration that a perpetrator has caused a
child harm. No public record of abusive behavior is made if only care
and protection proceedings are instigated. In more egregious cases,
the Family Court also has no power to protect the public, the victim
and other potential child victims through the specific deterrence and
isolation of imprisonment.
Focus on the perpetrator's accountability is also neglected in care
and protection proceedings. The Commissioner for Children noted
that family group conferences in care and protection proceedings
tended to emphasize family interests over the child's interests. 193
While criminal proceedings would not always take sufficient account
of the child's needs, they would not fail to consider that the parental
defendant should be held accountable. Battered children may grow
up wondering in retrospect why their cases were not taken seriously
by the criminal justice system.
While criminal approaches show increased concern for rehabilita-
tive measures such as pretrial diversion, civil approaches, such as re-
moval from the home, are becoming recognizably punitive, even if a
punitive purpose is unintended by the court.194 Criminal sanctions
193. COMM'R FOR CHILDREN (N.Z.), Report to the Minister of Social Welfare on the NZ Chil-
dren and Young Persons Services Review of Practice in Relation to Craig Manukau and his Family
cited in MARK HENAGHAN, NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
RIoHrs OF THE CHILD: A LACK OF BALANCE IN CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE PER-
SPECTIVE 165, 181 (Michael Freeman ed., Dartmouth Publishing, 1996).
194. Douglas Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-making, 24 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 315, 318 (1986).
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can also be less intrusive with regard to family stability. 195 For exam-
ple, if an offending parent was unwilling to cooperate with Child,
Youth, and Family, and termination of parental rights was too severe
an option, an intermediary criminal sanction such as a term of proba-
tion would be an option. 96
According to Richard Posner, "[t]he conventional legal thinker
draws an extremely sharp line between civil law and criminal law ....
This tendency is due in part to failing to take a functional approach
.... ,197 If the essentialist focus on ensuring a doctrinal fit limits the
ability of the court system to attend to the needs of child abuse vic-
tims, then perhaps the functionalist focus on the social impact of the
available remedies is the better focus. Increased enforcement of the
criminal laws against assaulting children could alleviate CYF's lack of
resources, while providing more protection for physical child abuse
victims and a more egalitarian approach to family violence. Ulti-
mately, the governments of New Zealand, the United States and other
English common law nations should repeal the defense and ade-
quately explain the current availability of other more appropriate de-
fenses to assault.
For a better use of resources to combat physical child abuse, greater
flexibility in approach, and greater accountability for perpetrators, an
increase in joint criminal and civil approaches to physical child abuse
is therefore warranted.'98 To achieve this, legal reform of the parental
discipline defense is necessary to achieve more consistency within
both criminal and civil cases of physical child abuse and to allow the
criminal justice system to effectively intervene when children are in-
jured by parental corporal punishment.
With regard to section 59 and parental corporal punishment, the
Family Court in New Zealand has stated, "If a change in the law is
desired, then it is for Parliament, not the Court, to bring it about." '99
A similar statement was made by the Superior Court of Justice in On-
195. See Cynthia Price Cohen, Freedom from Abuse: One of the Human Rights of Children,
11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 601, 614 (1986).
196. Douglas Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-making, 24 AM.
CRIM. L. Rav. 315, 354-355 (1986). In the author's experience as an Assistant District Attorney
in South Bend, Indiana, Superior Court judges often required cooperation with child welfare as
a term of probation for those convicted of physical child abuse.
197. Richard Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America 54, (cited in Thomas
Koenig & Michael Rustad 'Crimtorts' as Corporate Just Desserts, 31 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 289,
292 (1998).
198. See generally Victor I. Vieth, In My Neighbor's House: A Proposal to Address Child
Abuse in Rural America, 22 HAMLINE L. REv. 143, 157. Note that a dual civil/criminal approach
is permitted in New Zealand. See Appellant v. Police [1995] H.C. Hamilton AP 69/94. In this
case, no abuse of process was found when criminal charges for willful neglect were filed while
the child welfare agency was also acting.
199. Kendall v. Director-General of Social Welfare [1986] 3 F.R.N.Z. 1, 13, 15.
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tario, Canada: "It may well be that the time has come for Parliament
to give careful consideration to amending section 43 [the parental dis-
cipline defense] to provide specific criteria to guide parents, teachers
and law enforcement officials.... Judges, however, are not legislators,
nor should they be. ' '2°  Some in the American judiciary concur: "Re-
finements to the common law reasonableness standard implicate pol-
icy issues that are mainly for the legislative branch rather than the
courts."
2 0 1
Legislators must then become aware of the injustice and inconsis-
tency of the parental discipline defense, which undermines the in-
creased legal efforts around the world to protect children from the
violence of their caretakers, whether it is termed child abuse or do-
mestic violence. Legislative and grassroots movements have made
great strides to combat the maltreatment of children in the home. The
number of civil and criminal legal measures to protect against physical
child abuse has increased substantially in recent years, including the
mandatory reporting of child abuse, mandatory arrests and no-drop
prosecution in family violence cases, and the expansion of Depart-
ment of Social Services policies and intervention. Nevertheless, these
gains will continue to be undermined as long as parents retain the
legal right to physically injure their children in the name of reasonable
corporal punishment.
200. Can. Found. for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2000] 49 O.R.3d 662, 698. In
January 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada narrowed the definition of the parental discipline
defense, but did not abolish it. Can. Found. for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004]
S.C.C. 4. Text of the decision, available at www.lexum.umontreal.calcsc-scc/fr/pub/2004/voll/
index.html.
201. Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233, 1245 (D.C. 2002).
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APPENDIX: YEAR 2000 PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE REPORTS FROM
THE PORIRUA POLICE DEPARTMENT IN NEW ZEALAND
20 2
CASE PERPETRATOR ALLEGED ABUSE DISPOSITION




2 Father Kicked child Arrested, 2 counts
assault on a child,
acquitted
3 Father Pinched, pulled hair
4 Father and Slapped head and buttocks of 10 and 12
girlfriend year old
5 Mother Smacked and kicked 5 year old
6 Unknown Baby harmed during spousal violence
7 Father Violence to spouse and 11 year old
8 Mother Regular smacking with wooden spoon to 5
year old
9 Father Assaulted drunk 16 year old as discipline Warning
10 Mother "Hiding" to 14 year old No charges
11 Parents 2 year old hit on hand with ruler (breaking the Domestic violence
ruler) and hit repeatedly with wooden spoon, charged but not assault
also hit with chair during spousal violence on a child
12 Step-father 9 year old throttled and punched about Witnesses too
the body frightened to cooperate
13 Step-father Ongoing physical abuse to 12 year old No charges
14 Mother Slapped 6 year old across the face Warning
15 Unknown 1 year old's skull fractured Accidental
16 Step-father Physical abuse
17 Father Hit 6 year old on hand with shoe No charges
18 Father Punched child in face Arrested for assault on
a child, remand
19 Mother Pushed 3 year old down steps
20 Mother Punched 15 year old in face, nose bled
21 Step-father Assault on 6 year old and spousal abuse
22 Parents Hit, kicked and pulled hair of 15 year old No charges
23 Uncle Hit defiant 15 year old Warning
24 Mother Pushed 15 year old against window, back pain No charges
25 Aunt Punched head, pulled hair, and hit 14 year
old's body with flat side of knife
26 Step-father Ongoing physical abuse
202. Information was manually gathered by the author on May 28, 2001. All of the statistical
files of the Child Abuse Team of the Porirua Police Department in New Zealand were reviewed
for the year 2000. The reports of notifications of abuse are arranged randomly. Where no
disposition information is given, eventually the report may have been found to either lack
probable cause or contain sufficient probable cause for charging.
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CASE PERPETRATOR ALLEGED ABUSE DISPOSrION
27 Step-father Hit, pulled ears, smashed toys, and put knife to Protection Order,
throat of 9 year old, also spousal abuse Victim recanted
28 Step-father Hit 9 year old with broom, bruises to buttocks Charged
29 Father Minor bruise to leg No charges
30 Step-father Throttled 14 year old
31 Father Pulled hair, punched face of 14 year old, No charges
no marks
32 Mother Pinched 7 year old, bruising Charged assault on a
child
33 Father Hit head and body of 13 year old
34 Father Kicked 15 year old in head, bruising
35 Mother Threw 13 year old into car, head hit
36 Unknown Severe non-accidental burns to 5 year old
37 Father Hit child's leg with belt, bruising
38 Unknown Infant held by mother pushed during spousal Charged with assault
abuse, no injuries on a child
39 Mother Three year old's arm broken, legs bruised,
possible implement and pinching
40 Father Punched 13 year old in head, hit head with Charged, assault with a
chair, minor injury weapon, remand
41 Step-mother Hit 6 year old, threw into bath, cuts
42 Mother Hit 13 year old on back with knife sharpener
43 Father Pulled hair, slapped, objects thrown, ongoing
abuse to 7 and 10 year old
44 Aunt Punched 14 year old, black eye Charged with assault
on a child, Supervision
45 Father Punched child's head, bruises, swelling
46 Father Hit 14 year old
47 Mother Hit 9 year old with metal spoon, bruises
48 Mother Punched 15 year old in back Warning
49 Mother Hit 12 year old, ankle bruised Warning
50 Father No charges
51 Father Hit 16 year old in face
52 Mother Lifted 10 year old by hair
53 Father Hit 14 year old Charged, remanded
54 Step-father Hit 8 year old, also spouse abuse
55 Caregivers Historical physical abuse
56 Mother Punched 13 year old, hit leg with spatula.
Bruising
57 Mother Hit 10 year old on back with jug cord, welts Charged, remanded
and bruises
58 Mother Sore on hand of 2 year old No charges
59 Father Pulled 2 and 3 year old by hair, also
spouse abuse
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CASE PERPETRATOR ALLEGED ABUSE DIsPosIoN
60 Step-father Face of 4 year old severely bruised Charged, 12 months
supervision
61 Father Bruise to ear of 4 year old, handprint on
buttocks, also spousal abuse
62 Caregiver Hit and twisted ears of 7 and 2 year olds
63 Mother Physical abuse to 6 year old
64 Step-father Hit 13 year old's face, bruising
65 Father Punched 9 year old and dragged him about Charged with assault
on a child
66 Adult brother Assaulted 11 year old, thrown on floor, Charged with assault
minor bruising on a child
67 Father Threw telephone at 4 year old, hit in head,
welts and cuts
68 Aunt Broke bottle over 16 year old's head
69 Mother Black eye to 10 year old
70 Unknown Skull fracture to 2 year old Insufficient evidence of
intent
71 Father Punched 13 year old in head Recant, no charges
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